Chapter 21

THE SOCIAL MATRIX OF EMOTION EXPRESSION AND REGULATION

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Emotional expression and regulation are integrally tied to the dynamics of interaction and serve important functions for individuals, dyads, organizations, and cultures. In this chapter, we summarize theories and empirical research that illustrate the intersection among emotion experience, expression, and regulation and the ways in which this intersection is manifested in and shaped by communication processes. We begin with two fundamental questions: What do we mean by emotion, expression, and regulation, and what are the theoretical approaches that frame their analysis?
Emotion, Expression, and Regulation: Definitional and Theoretical Issues

Definitions

Scholars disagree about definitions of emotion and even debate whether such discussions are worthwhile (Bard & Cornelius, 2007). They generally agree, however, that emotions are complicated phenomena whose workings, especially in the social world, are best captured by studying them from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Most researchers either posit working definitions or proceed with implicit definitions they believe will be palatable to readers and work well enough to advance the research.

For our purposes, we draw on Keltner and Gross’s (1999) definition of emotions as “episodic, relatively short-term biologically based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action, and communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and opportunities” (p. 468). Intuition and empirical research offer joy, love, surprise, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and shame as examples but exclude enduring mood states such as depression and dispositions such as social anxiety (Sedikides, 1992; Watson & Clark, 1992). Emotion expression refers to the outward manifestations of emotional states. However, expression is sometimes used in the limited sense of nonverbal “displays” of emotional states (primarily in facial patterns) as well as in the broader sense of communicative behaviors that reference emotions that have no characteristic display pattern. Emotion regulation refers to the processes by which individuals control the intensity and quality of emotional experience and the degree to which this experience is fully expressed, if at all (Gross, 1998). Indeed, there may be no such thing as a truly spontaneous emotion untouched by regulation. The ubiquitous shaping forces of language and cultural learning are inherent constraints on both the content of emotional
experience (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007) and its expression and regulation (Davidson, 2003).

**Theoretical Approaches to EER**

Although the broad conceptual landscape of emotional expression and regulation (hereafter EER) is difficult to map, several theoretical approaches emerge as useful, albeit with substantial overlap among them. We offer a brief description of each perspective as it guides research on EER and informs the discussions of EER at the four levels of analysis that follow.

*Functional.* In his essays on the evolutionary advantages of emotions in man and [other] animals, Darwin (1872/1965) was first to recognize that emotions are functional responses to environmental cues. More recently, scholars have extended the notion of survival to include the protection and continuation of the collective (i.e., social and cultural groups) as well as the individual (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Thus, Darwin’s theory of evolution as applied to emotion is now reflected in theories clustered within functional approaches to EER.

Darwin’s most direct scholarly progeny are the extensive programs of research on facial expression and recognition by Ekman, primarily with adults, and Izard, primarily with children (Ekman, 1973, 2003; Izard, 1977; Izard & Ackerman, 2000). In addition, these approaches to EER reveal the variety of functions served at the individual and social levels, including managing priorities; guiding action; guiding distribution of resources; providing information; forming, reinforcing, and protecting social bonds; negotiating goals; and socializing shared values and norms. Lazarus’s (1991) theory based on the person-in-environment relationship and Izard and colleagues’ differential emotions theory (DET; Izard & Ackerman, 2000) provide the
most explicit articulations. Keltner and Haidt (1999) have also provided a broad sweep of functions of EER across four levels of analysis: the individual, dyad, group, and culture.

*Process/Componential.* Analyzing emotion as an unfolding process made up of components operating at several levels (psychological, neurological, physiological, and behavioral) is perhaps the most comprehensive and inclusive approach to characterizing the complex processes of EER (Frijda, 1986). For example, neuroimaging studies of the brain confirm the central role of the amygdala in recognizing affectively loaded stimuli and then activating higher order systems associated with physiological/behavioral responses and with processing the meaning/content of the stimulus (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000). Thus, cognition (whether consciously attended or not) quickly enters the process. Several lines of research on the appraisal process indicate that emotional arousal is processed psychologically, based on situational cues and social norms (Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Regulation may operate through all stages of appraisal—primary, secondary, and reappraisal—although it is most consciously employed during secondary appraisal and reappraisal (Gross, 1998). During these stages, preliminary response patterns may be moderated or exaggerated, and the nature of the emotion experience may be defined and redefined.

*Linguistic and Textual.* Communication scholars are particularly drawn to approaches that highlight the ways people talk about and with emotion. Studies range from micro-indicators of emotion—such as language intensity and verbal immediacy—to emotion vocabularies and more macro-level analyses of metaphor, euphemisms, and imagery (Bowers, Metts, & Duncanson, 1985; Fussell, 2002). Linguistic work across cultures is notable, including analysis of emotion words in many languages (Hupka, Lenton, & Hutchison, 1999), analysis of metaphors (Kövecses, 2000), and cross-cultural comparisons of emotion words (Wierzbicka, 1994). Larger
texts have also been analyzed with a political lens, from the pioneering work of Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990) to more recent work by Ahmed (2004).

Skills Based. A number of scholars have recently focused attention on the skills necessary to recognize emotions and appropriately regulate their expression. Ekman’s research originally focused on accuracy of facial recognition by adults, and that concern has evolved over the decades into a much broader effort to understand how emotion cues and knowledge are used skillfully or unskillfully to varying degrees. These goals led Ekman and Friesen (1975) to formulate the system of emotion display rules (simulation, inhibition, intensification, deintensification, and masking) that guide the expression of emotion (even when not felt) according to social norms. Grounded in the scholarly work of Salovey, Mayer, and colleagues (e.g., Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000) and popularized (some would say distorted) by Goleman (1995), emotional intelligence has become almost a household phrase. The construct includes an array of abilities broadly clustered into those associated with recognizing emotions in self and others, expressing emotions appropriately, and responding effectively to expressions of others (see Mathews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004). Saarni (1999) and others (see Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2000) have expanded Izard’s work with infants into an impressive body of literature on the development of EER skills and capabilities across the life span, with emphasis on childhood but even extending to the elderly (Labouvie-Vief, Devoe, & Bulka, 1990).

Therapeutic. Therapeutic aspects of EER date back to the ancient Greek notion of catharsis, entered the 20th century with Freud’s “talking cure,” and persist in scholarly debates today about the when, how, what for’s, pros, and cons of expressing, suppressing, and regulating emotions (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999). The therapeutic nature of talking or writing about difficult emotions has been made testable through somatic indicators of health such as immune responses
(Booth & Pennebaker, 2000). The EER of trauma, in particular, has received considerable attention (e.g., Kirmayer, Lemelson, & Barad, 2007), as has work on posttraumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006).

**Interactional and Self-Presentational.** Two millennia ago, Aristotle addressed the role of EER in impression management, enactment of social roles, persuasion, credibility, friendships and enmity, justice, and other social issues that occupy scholars today (Cooper, 1932). More recently, Goffman’s (1959, 1967) dramaturgical model linked emotions to social performance (both as cause and effect) and to smooth interactions among actors and audience members. One well-known descendant of Goffman’s work is Hochschild’s (1983) notion of the “managed heart,” applied most often but not exclusively to workplaces with sensitivity to the commodification and transmutation of emotion. Other scholars have engaged EER from ritual, symbolic interactionist, exchange, structural, and other perspectives (Turner & Stets, 2005). Indeed, emotion serves as a resource as individuals enact, negotiate, adjust, and change social roles whether at home (Hochschild, 1989), at work (Tracy, 2000), or in the community (Flam & King, 2005).

**Social Constructionist and Poststructuralist.** The dominant theme of the social constructionist perspective is that we feel, express, and regulate emotions that fit within a particular catalog of linguistic choices, historical forces, and social activities (Harré, 1986; Harré & Parrott, 1996). A strong constructionist position denies that emotion has any fixed biological underpinnings, but most scholars recognize that both relatively immutable biology and relatively flexible social constructions influence EER (Oatley, 1993). From this point of view, the thoughts and physical reactions associated with emotion are constantly changing, culturally sensitive, and dependent on local norms and discourses (Averill, 1994).
Communication scholars have also borrowed from poststructuralist theories that frame emotion as an ongoing subjective and interactional process, constructed through multiple, contradictory, and overlapping discourses (Foucault, 1980). A poststructural approach views the self and emotions as overdetermined and fragmented. Feelings are not “real” or “fake.” Rather, emotions as well as feelings of (in)authenticity are embedded in and moderated by multiple discourses of power (Tracy, 2005).

**EER at Four Levels of Analysis**

In this section, we review the research, following Keltner and Haidt (1999), at the individual, dyadic, organizational, and cultural levels of analysis. As with theoretical perspectives, it is common for lines of research to cross levels. After all, emotion is expressed and regulated by individuals in their interactions in dyads, groups, and organizations against a backdrop of culture. So even though we may place research at one level (perhaps somewhat arbitrarily), more often than not it will “bleed over” into other levels of analysis.

**Individuals**

Research on EER within individuals is dominated by the therapeutic approach. The goals are to enhance mental health by addressing the pros and cons of expression and suppression and by offering and assessing strategies for regulation (interfacing here with a skills perspective). Developments in neurology and genetics and the search for effective regulation strategies have also implicated the process/component view to a great extent. Even at the level of individual EER, the social interactionist perspective plays a role as well.

*Modes of Expression.* Descriptive analyses of modes of expressing emotion have been going on for decades, reaching their zenith in Ekman’s muscle-by-muscle facial affect coding system
(FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Nevertheless, it is clear that a more complete picture of emotional expression must include vocal (Johnstone & Scherer, 2000), verbal (e.g., Fussell, 2002), body and movement cues, actions, and even context (Planalp, 1998). How those cues are generated in combination or interpreted as a gestalt is anybody’s guess (Planalp & Knie, 2002). Although much work on modes of expression assumes that expression is the same regardless of social circumstances, Kraut and Johnston (1979) noted that bowlers smiled more when looking at or talking to others than when they made strikes, Fridlund (1991) demonstrated that even the belief that a friend was watching a funny video increased smiling, and Scherer (1994) writes convincingly of “push” (from the biological process) and “pull” (toward social expectations) as both influencing expression.

**Suppression vs. Expression.** Many researchers have analyzed the pros and cons of expressing versus suppressing emotion for the individual. Suppressing a felt emotion takes effort and memory capacity (Richards & Gross, 2000) and may backfire as “post suppression rebound” (Wegner, 1992), whereas expression may help individuals reach helpful insights, especially about traumatic events (Pennebaker, 1997). Other scholars argue, however, that venting aggression without reflection may lead to more aggressive behavior (Bushman, Baumeister, & Stack, 1999), and extreme and prolonged expression may intensify or prolong arousal (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999).

The suppression/expression debate quickly moves beyond the individual to dyadic, social, and cultural concerns. As Tavris (1989) puts it, “If expressed anger causes another person to shoot you, it won’t matter that you die with very healthy arteries” (p. 129). Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999) raise additional issues such as how too much or too little expression affects support, relationship maintenance, and rejection if norms are violated, as well as differing
gender, family, and cultural norms of expression. By now, the debate has moved to questions of what should be expressed when, how, to whom, under what circumstances, and with what goals; thus it slides into the realm of regulation, which has burgeoned recently (e.g., Gross, 2007; Philippot & Feldman, 2004).

*Strategies for Regulation.* Process or component models help to organize the broad repertoire of emotion management options (e.g., Planalp, 1999). Reappraisal is widely studied and clearly influenced by messages from dyads, organizations, and cultures. Techniques may target maladaptive beliefs, mental biases, or explanatory styles (Peterson & Park, 2007; Segrin, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) or implement more productive thinking patterns such as mindfulness (interfacing with the skills approach). Physiological reactions can be addressed with deep breathing, exercise, or alcohol and drugs. Of course, expression can be also used in the service of regulation, as discussed above. Recent work has turned this array of strategies toward special populations and problems, where the skills and therapeutic perspectives founded in developmental work come into play.

**Dyads and Close Relationships**

Several of the theoretical approaches to EER described previously are useful for analyzing dyadic and relational interaction. Undoubtedly, a few discrete emotions have hard-wired or innate facial displays (e.g., fear, anger, sadness, and joy). However, these basic emotions are now embedded within complex derivative emotion families, and their expression is largely symbolic rather than spontaneous (Buck, Losow, Murphy, & Costanzo, 1992). Thus, evolutionary theory necessarily interfaces with sociological theories of emotional experience and the functions served by emotion expression.
Emotion Expression. Most scholars agree that emotional expressivity is a fundamental aspect of social attraction (Sabatelli & Rubin, 1986). Evolutionary theory accounts for this phenomenon as a logical mechanism in ensuring social survival. Boone and Buck (2003) argue that emotional expressivity (i.e., moderate levels of expressiveness that are easy for receivers to interpret accurately) facilitates social coordination because it signals that the sender is cooperative and trustworthy. Presumably, such signals allow others to select associates, friends, and mates who will not exploit them and will therefore be socially and reproductively beneficial. Even sex differences in the relatively more frequent and acceptable expressions of anger for men compared to women have been explained as the manifestation of early males’ competitive environment. Similarly, the tendency to say “I love you” first in a developing relationship and to respond more assertively to feelings of romantic jealousy are attributed to the early male prerogative in mating sequences (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).

Dramatism and related sociological perspectives also recognize the utility of emotion expression but characterize it in terms of role enactment and social performance. Both the experience and expression of emotion are linked to the successful or unsuccessful maintenance of face during social performance (Goffman, 1959, 1967). Loss of face results in guilt, embarrassment, or shame and disrupts the role performance for all interactants. The inept performer is expected to express the concomitant displays of these social emotions and enact remedial behaviors that restore social order (Goffman, 1959).

A central aspect of successful public performance is the ability to follow socially defined display rules—the “socially learned, often culturally different, rules about the management of expression, about who can show which emotion to whom and when they can do so” (Ekman,
2003, p. 4). In Western cultures, these rules mandate expressing positive emotions (e.g., interest or happiness), which facilitate “benign” interaction and restraining expression of negative emotions (e.g., anger or sadness), which might induce conflict or distress for others through emotional contagion (Malatesta & Izard, 1984). This norm is so pervasive that even when research participants are instructed to act as though they do not like the person with whom they are interacting, they still begin the conversation with displays of liking such as smiling and forward lean, only slowly decreasing them during the course of the conversation (Ray & Floyd, 2006). Similarly, respondents rate individuals in videotapes and photographs as more likeable when they are laughing than when they are not, even though the respondents can easily distinguish the fake laughter from the genuine laughter (Reysen, 2006).

Of course, violations of the normative preference for positive emotion expression are a functional alternative, in some cases. Confiding in a close other when feeling sad, hurt, or disappointed is usually productive in alleviating initial distress (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001) and facilitating the coping process through reappraisal (Bartsch & Hubner, 2005; Burleson & Goldsmith, 1998). However, it only functions effectively when the situation frames its appropriateness, the dyad has the expectation of intimate sharing, and the expression is limited in duration. Inappropriate, excessive, or continued expressions of sadness tend to shift listeners’ attributions from unfortunate circumstances to personal dispositions of the expresser (Karasawa, 1995). Violations of the positivity bias may also be used strategically to facilitate self-presentational goals (Garner, 1996). This is evident when people strategically intensify the display of anger to achieve the self-presentational goal of intimidation and control (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996).
Awareness of emotion display rules and their social consequences are acquired early in life (Misailidi, 2006). Zeman and Garber (1996) analyzed the responses of first-, third-, and fifth-grade children to scenarios in which a child felt anger, sadness, and physical pain. Regardless of the emotion, children reported that they would exert significantly more expressive control in the presence of peers than in the presence of mother or father or when alone. These children had already learned to appraise the potential costs of expressing negative emotions (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) and to assume that parental acceptance moderates the potential for negative dispositional attributions.

*EER in the Development and Maintenance of Romantic Relationships.* To recognize the relatively greater emotional openness characteristic of close relationships does not mean that emotion regulation and strategic expression are irrelevant. Indeed, they are fundamental elements in both the formation and maintenance of close relationships, especially romantic relationships (Guerrero & Andersen, 2000). Romantic relationships in Western cultures are crafted, more or less strategically, from the array of possible associations encountered in the social matrix. Central to the developmental process is the adaptation of cultural display norms to the more emotionally open climate of close relationships. This transition can be a challenge because during the initiation stage, displays of positive affect are necessary to attract potential partners; however, as individuals become more interdependent and interact in more varied contexts, the positivity bias is difficult to maintain. Disagreements and “bad” behavior are inevitable. Thus, negative emotional expression tends to increase during the turbulent middle stages of relationship development (Knobloch, Miller, & Carpenter, 2007) and decrease over time as relational partners reduce uncertainty and establish interaction norms, trust, and acceptance.
Murray and Holmes (1996) propose that romantic couples who successfully navigate the transition phases of relationship formation are able to balance the dialectic of “hope and doubt.” Hope that this will be the “right person” is fostered during the initiation phase; however, doubt begins to emerge when a potential partner’s negative behaviors can no longer be explained away as situational anomalies. In relationships that continue to be satisfying, partners balance this dialectic by embedding anomalies within positive emotional schemas known as positive illusions (Murray & Holmes, 1996), and in relationships with high commitment, divergent behaviors will be accommodated through benign attributions and positive emotional responses (Rusbult, Yovetich, & Verette, 1996).

Although appraisal theory is not explicitly incorporated into this line of research, it provides a useful theoretical framework. Gross and colleagues’ model of emotion regulation (Richards, Butler, & Gross, 2003; Richards & Gross, 2000) distinguishes two types of emotion regulation: cognitive reappraisal (interpreting an event in positive terms at the time of the emotional arousal) and suppression (concealing overt signs of emotional arousal). We speculate that positive illusions and benign attributions shape the appraisal process in relationally productive ways. Specifically, in satisfying relationships, emotional arousal is recognized and motivates open discussion of the problem; however, because cognitive reappraisal is positive, the discussion is less likely to escalate into conflict. In troubled relationships, cognitive reappraisal is not employed and arousal is intense, unfocused, and/or negative. The only options seem to be uncontrolled expression or suppression of overt expression. Support for this speculation is evident in Gottman and Levenson’s (2002) analysis of marital conflict. They identified two expressive patterns that predicted divorce over a 14-year period. Early divorce was predicted by “unregulated volatile positive and negative affect,” whereas later divorce was predicted by high
emotional neutrality or suppression of felt emotion (i.e., physiological measures recorded high arousal, but facial coding showed little expression).

Research that moves beyond the couple as the unit of analysis indicates that emotional regulation has implications for children as well. For example, Katz and Gottman (1993) found that mutually hostile or demand/withdrawal patterns in the conflict of parents influenced children’s social competence and emotional well-being over time. Likewise, studies of emotional contagion and emotional transmission indicate that the emotions experienced by parents outside of the home are often transmitted to the children. Typically, the pattern involves negative emotions experienced by fathers that are transmitted to mothers and subsequently from mothers to their children (Larson & Almeida, 1999).

*Relationship Specific Emotions.* EER is also relevant to close relationships because certain emotions are definitively embedded within a relational frame that determines their functions. For example, we can become angry with a rude driver, a disorganized store clerk, or even our computer, but only relational partners can make us feel hurt or jealous. Hurt is experienced when a close other diminishes a partner’s worth or the value of the relationship. Although sometimes difficult to express because it is a blend of sadness, fear, and anger, controlled expression of hurt functions to inform (remind) a partner about areas of vulnerability and gives him or her an opportunity to apologize and reconfirm personal/relational worth (Vangelisti, 2007). We experience jealousy when a close relationship is threatened by a rival. Like hurt, jealousy is a blend of other emotions (fear, anger, sadness, love) and is sometimes difficult to express. When appropriately expressed, however, it serves personal and relational functions, such as
strengthening the primary relationship, confirming self-esteem, and reducing uncertainty about the primary relationship as well as the rival relationship (Guerrero & Andersen, 1998).

Finally, romantic love is perhaps the most popularized exemplar of a relationship-specific emotional state. In a developing relationship, expressions of love not only signal an emotional state but also a desired relational definition. Thus, Tolhuizen (1989) includes the expression of love as a relationship intensification strategy (rather than a relationship initiation strategy), and Baxter and Bullis (1986) include it within the passion turning point. However, the expression of love is also risky if not reciprocated by one’s partner. The cautious distance between first feelings of love and their expression is evident in the research by Flora and Segrin (2000). They found that a euphoric state of “felt like you were walking on cloud nine” was experienced within only 2.76 months of dating; however, the statement “I love you” was spoken after 3.63 months. Apparently, these respondents continued to (re)appraise their own feelings and the situational cues from their partner before explicitly making the relational definition bid.

Of course, expressions of love can also be used to meet a variety of self-presentational and interactional goals. Booth-Butterfield and Trotta (1994) analyzed dating couples’ descriptions of the circumstances surrounding the first expression of love. Although half of the sample linked the expression to true feelings, about 20% attributed the expression to situational or normative expectations (e.g., a delightful evening or “made love” for the first time), and about 13% attributed it to a specific motive (e.g., gaining sexual compliance or testing the other person’s response).

Organizations

Organizational practitioners and researchers have historically undervalued emotionality, viewed it as antithetical to rationality, or treated it as a commodity to be channeled and
commercialized. Communication scholars have been central in critiquing this notion. Mumby and Putnam (1992) offer the concept of “bounded emotionality” as an “alternative mode of organizing in which nurturance, caring, community, supportiveness, and interrelatedness are fused with individual responsibility to shape organizational experiences” (p. 474). Organizational communication scholars have examined the ways that emotion is constructed, constrained, and moderated through micro-practices and macro-discourses. Such research is clustered around the topics of burnout and stress, emotion labor, emotional intelligence, humor and moods, and emotional abuse/bullying.

Stress and Burnout. Given that early research framed emotion as problematic and something that needed to be regulated and constrained, it is not surprising that much organizational research is focused on emotional “burnout.” Presumably, workers experience a general “wearing out” from the pressures of work and experience emotional exhaustion, depersonalization of coworkers and clients, and diminished feelings of personal accomplishment (Maslach, 1982). Burnout is especially common among “helping” and caring professionals (e.g., nurses, teachers, social workers) who have intense social contact with others.

The concept of emotional contagion is central to burnout research (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). For example, K. I. Miller, Stiff, and Ellis (1988) introduced a two-pronged conceptualization of empathy consisting of (a) emotional contagion, in which the caregiver experiences emotional responses parallel to the client’s emotion, and (b) empathic concern, or a concern about the welfare of another without feeling parallel emotions. While empathic concern leads to increased satisfaction and decreased burnout, emotional contagion can encourage depersonalization of clients and lead to burnout for the worker.
The preponderance of literature suggests that stress and burnout are personal pathologies best combated through individual techniques such as deep breathing, biofeedback, and therapy (Newton, 1995). In contrast to this individualistic approach, organizational communication scholars have identified a number of structural factors that mitigate burnout and stress. These include social support, strong superior-subordinate relationships, participation in decision making, and organizational identification (Tracy, 2005). Alternatively, the conservation of resources model (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Hobfoll, 1989) suggests that burnout is not directly tied to a specific task or high level of workload. Rather, it is based on the supposition that stress depends on the immediate rewards of the task and that people feel stress when valuable resources are threatened.

*Emotional Labor.* Emotional labor is among the most common themes of emotion study in organizations. It draws heavily from the social constructionist and dramaturgical perspectives, suggesting that employees regulate and express emotions in accord with the face they are expected to present on the organizational stage. Given the general cultural mandate to appear likeable and pleasant, most members of an organization tend to express positive emotions more freely and control the expression of negative emotions more carefully (Kramer & Hess, 2002). Different rules exist in different arenas, and public or “front stage” areas (e.g., serving patrons at their table in a restaurant) have stricter rules regarding performance than private “back stage” areas (e.g., the kitchen). Hochschild (1983) initiated the study of instrumental emotional display in her study of Delta flight attendants. *Emotion management* is the routine practice of aligning emotion displays with social norms, such as looking happy when given a gift. *Emotion labor* is the commercialization of this process, when the emotional fronts of employees are co-opted and controlled by management for reasons of increased profit.
Communication researchers have examined the way employees work to construct a variety of emotional demeanors, ranging from inflated cheeriness, to neutrality and calm, to the repression of fear and anger. Most studies have been qualitative and interpretive, investigating the costs and rewards of emotion labor of a variety of professions, including 911 call takers (Shuler & Sypher, 2000), cruise staff (Tracy, 2000), teachers (McPherson, Kearney, & Plax, 2003), and firefighters (Scott & Myers, 2005), among others.

*Emotional Intelligence.* Emotional intelligence is the most commercialized emotion concept in the organizational realm, producing consultants, corporate training sessions, and popular press books. The core assumption of emotional intelligence is that good business practice requires competencies associated with EER. The concept is closely associated with transformational leadership—a style in which leaders respond to the emotional needs of employees, develop trust and cooperation, and engender enthusiasm for the organizational task at hand (Fineman, 2006). Although the study of emotional intelligence has a long-standing tradition in the academic world, the publication of Goleman’s popular press books, *Emotional Intelligence* (1995) and *Working With Emotional Intelligence* (1998), brought the concept to the general public and introduced two domains of competence: personal and social. Personal competence includes self-awareness, self-regulation, and motivation. Social competence includes empathy and social skills (such as leadership and influence).

Goleman’s contribution is something of a mixed blessing. His model may have little to offer those who take seriously the construct of emotional competencies. The only direct reference to emotional competencies is “emotional self-awareness,” “empathy,” and perhaps “optimism.” On the other hand, the management skills and professional competencies included in his model are useful tools within any organization. Goleman’s work may not be theoretically
and empirically grounded; however, its popularity suggests that organizational members and researchers alike recognize the importance of emotional skills, particularly in coping with occupational stress and managing problematic relationships (Mathews et al., 2004).

Organizational Humor and Morale. A strain of research that aligns with the functional approach to emotion is the examination of positive moods, morale, and humor in groups and organizations. Employees in negative moods are less satisfied, experience more burnout, and are more likely to leave their job. However, they are also likely to better process cognitive information and make finer judgments (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Thus, good moods are linked to rasher decisions but also to increased creativity, satisfaction, and resilience. A key way organizations attempt to tap into the benefits of good moods is through humor. While managerial attempts to control humor are difficult and can backfire (Collinson, 2002), a number of studies find workplace humor to be functional. Humor can enhance job satisfaction; provide in-group solidarity; manage the emotions of others; help employees cope with low-level work; construct organizational culture; provide opportunities to strategically avoid certain topics, issues, or people; reduce burnout and job stress; reveal organizational values and beliefs; help employees adjust to change; and provide avenues for organizational sensemaking (Tracy, Myers, & Scott, 2006).

Workplace Emotional Abuse. Emotional communication also has a dark side, as typified by workplace transgressions or misbehaviors, including incivility, bullying, and emotional abuse (Metts, Cupach, & Lippert, 2006). Incivility includes various forms of rude behavior inconsistent with norms of respect and cooperation. Bullying is long-term, persistent harassment that feels intentional to the target. Emotional abuse comes in the form of insults, threats, intimidation, signs of contempt, isolation, and discounting the target’s worth or competence, often from a superior. Communication scholars have examined the prevalence, harm, and cycle of workplace
misbehavior, the emotional pain of abuse, and resistance to bullying (Lutgen-Sandvik, 2006; Lutgen-Sandvik, Tracy, & Alberts, in press; Tracy, Lutgen-Sandvik, & Alberts, 2006).

Consistent with emotion theory, the three families of emotions experienced in response to workplace misbehaviors are anger, hurt, and insecurity-related emotions (Metts et al., 2006). Employees may respond to bullying and emotional abuse through seeking social support and constructing narratives that may be credible to power holders who might initiate change. Employees may also move beyond the occasions of abuse through through compassion (Miller, 2007) as well as forgiveness—transforming initial negative emotions into positive regard, which facilitates reconstruction of workplace harmony (Metts et al., 2006).

Cultures

At the cultural level, EER is studied from several theoretical lenses with contributions from many disciplines. Although arguments can be made for the universality of certain expressions, the bulk of research has explored variation in EER across cultures, including linguistic variation and, to a much lesser extent, historical contexts. A new contribution for communication scholars is to study how culturally shared media resources are used in EER.

Universality and Cultural Variability. Ekman (1993) used an evolutionary perspective and extensive data to argue that the face is the most likely locus of universally recognizable emotional expressions. Russell (1994) reinterpreted Ekman’s data, however, as indicating little better than chance recognition, except for discriminating positive and negative emotions. No other modalities such as the voice, body, or language have been suggested as universal, although some specific cues such as blushing may be.
Cultural variability in EER is so widely observed that summarizing the evidence is challenging, although the process model of emotion provides a useful organizing scheme (Mesquita & Albert, 2007). The richest pictures of EER come from anthropologists working from social interaction or social constructionist perspectives to describe the emotional worlds of diverse cultures, especially those most removed from Western influence. By contrast, variability within European-based cultures is much subtler (Scherer, 1988). Notable ethnographies with much to say about regulation have been done for the Inuit of northern Canada (Briggs, 1970), the Ifaluk of the western Pacific (Lutz, 1988), the Ilongots of the Philippines (Rosaldo, 1980), the Balinese (Wikan, 1990), and others (see, e.g., Heelas, 1986). Emotional expression is often addressed (e.g., Irvine, 1990), but regulation is a dominant theme because of its many manifestations in childhood socialization, collective rituals, conflict negotiations, philosophies of emotion control, and intercultural misunderstandings.

Although the EER skills that are needed to function as adult members of each culture are rarely addressed directly, they can often be inferred. Briggs (1970), for example, describes in detail how Inuit children are encouraged and coerced into skillfully regulating their anger so that it is almost completely suppressed in adulthood. The therapeutic approach can also be found in discussions of what different cultures consider emotionally healthy, how imbalance or emotional illness can be remedied (Georges, 1995), and how trauma can be transformed socially (Bloom, 1998).

**Linguistic and Historical Influences.** The structure of emotion words in different languages has been analyzed, often as a complement to ethnographic work (e.g., Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). The basic distinction between positive and negative emotion words is common, but further distinctions are highly variable across cultures. Historians also analyze written texts to
give accounts of EER during different historical periods. For example, W. I. Miller (1993) used the Icelandic sagas to provide a compelling account of Viking negotiations of honor and humiliation. Stearns’s edited volumes (e.g., Stearns & Lewis, 1998) and books reveal EER in etiquette and advice manuals, personal letters, written accounts of sermons, song lyrics, newspaper articles, advertising, and the like. From that work, one gets the sense of EER being as variable historically as it is culturally.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume uniformity within geographically or historically defined cultures without considering social positions based on gender, status, age, ethnicity, social roles, and other factors. Shields (2002) criticizes the tendency to study gender and emotion in terms of similarities and differences and proposes instead to consider how emotion is gendered (e.g., “Emotional = female; angry = male?”; Shields, 2002, pp. 139–168) and how we “do” gendered emotion through EER. Although she focuses on the United States, her perspective is consistent with evidence from other cultures. One does not do Balinese EER but rather low-status, young, female Balinese EER, so a great deal of knowledge beyond general cultural expectations is needed to tune EER performances to social niches. Of course, those who haven’t quite “melted” into melting pot cultures or into new social roles may experience tensions between competing EER expectations (Diner, 1998).

A relatively new domain of inquiry that holds promise for communication researchers is the role of the mass media in EER. Research on emotion and the media is well established, with most work focusing on emotional responses to media content (e.g., Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Cantor, 2003). More relevant to EER is the use of media (video, music, television) as a culturally shared resource for managing emotion or mood. Obviously, individuals may manage feelings by making choices to read pleasant or unpleasant news (Knobloch-Westerwick & Alter, 2006) or to
watch TV programming relevant to specific feelings such as regret (Nabi, Finnerty, Domschke, & Hull, 2006). Similarly, collective responses to shared emotionally charged or traumatic events are undoubtedly shaped by media responses, either as a direct result of seeking solace or an indirect result of seeking information (Buttny & Ellis, 2007). In addition, ample opportunities exist to study expressions of emotion in public media channels such as blogs or YouTube.

**Conclusion**

Emotions are an important interface between the personal and the public, the self, and the social world. Our goal in this chapter has been to illustrate the complex but systematic nature of this interface by reviewing theoretical and empirical accounts of emotion at the individual, dyadic/relational, organizational, and cultural levels. We close with an invitation for scholars to continue to explore the domains of inquiry that we have summarized here. The ubiquitous and influential nature of emotional experience, expression, and regulation merits the attention of communication scholars interested in both the mundane and extraordinary aspects of social life.

**References**


*Cognition and Emotion, 13,* 505–521.


